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Introduction 
Significant changes have occurred in recent years in our thinking around the purpose and 
impact of aid from North to South. There is still disagreement on how effective and efficient 
aid is, and there is an equal lack of consensus on what sort of assistance is best suited to 
furthering economic and political development. The African continent has been at the centre 
of this debate. Despite billions of dollars of aid money allocated over the past decades3, the 
continent has fallen behind the rest of the world in terms of economic growth, and living 
standards have decreased in several African countries since their independence. Some of the 
countries that received the most aid are still among the world’s poorest today.  
 
 
1 Paper presented at the Conference The Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations: An Agenda of Priorities, for 
the panel ‘The reinforcement of democratic structures: what role for the European Union?’, in Lisbon, 23-24 
October 2003. 
2 Dr. Hammerstad is a senior researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs. 
3 Net flows of Official Development Assistance to developing countries from the Development Assistance 
Committee members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) constituted 
over US$ 52 billion in 2001. US$ 13.9 billion of this went to sub-Saharan Africa. Source: The World Bank, 
World Development Indicators 2003 (Washington: World Bank, April 2003), tables on p. 336 and p. 340. 
   
While the debate on the efficacy of aid is far from resolved, one clear trend in aid strategies 
can be discerned in the period of the last ten to fifteen years. This is the increased weight 
and importance placed on democracy, good political governance and human rights, both as a 
condition for aid and as a priority field for aid activities. In Africa, this new emphasis is 
shared by aid donors and recipients alike. It can be seen in aid donors’ formulation of 
strategies, programmes and aims, and, to a lesser degree, in the prioritisations of African 
countries themselves, particularly in their formulation and endorsement of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
 
This paper will first take a look at the change in aid priorities that has taken place in recent 
years before it moves on to a discussion of the pros and cons of placing democracy and 
good governance prominently on the aid agenda. It will ask how democratisation and good 
political governance can be supported and furthered through aid. Is this an effective and 
efficient way of spending aid money? What are the economic and political problems with 
this approach? Are there better ways of supporting democratisation than through aid?  
 
While political governance should certainly remain on the agenda of donors and – more 
importantly – on the agenda of the recipients of aid, the recent turn towards a more 
aggressive stance on this issue from donors also entails problems. It has made the provision 
of aid much more politically intrusive and controversial, and it has made recipient states of 
aid acutely aware of the sovereignty loss they may incur if they accept this aid. This is an 
important factor if we are to understand the current strain in African-European relations.  
A new aid agenda? 
During the Cold War years good governance and democracy were not foremost among the 
concerns of Western aid givers. Good governance conditionalities were not placed on aid 
money, nor was aid focused on democratisation efforts. This statement warrants one big 
qualification. During the Cold War period there was of course one big conditionality that 
decided whether a developing country would be the beneficiary of the aid and co-operation 
of the Western world. This conditionality was anti-communism. To put it crudely, the world 
was divided into communist and anti-communist blocs (rather than communist and 
democratic), and this geo-political division – rather than any internal characteristic, such as 
democracy, human rights, corruption, nepotism, or political repression – would determine 
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aid levels. Only within the logic of this Cold War overlay could a corrupt, wasteful dictator 
like President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire receive grant after grant from Western donors and 
loan after loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Conditions concerning internal 
policies were not attached to this aid, at the same time as Zaire was gradually and thoroughly 
ground into economic and political collapse through misrule. The example of Zaire – later 
the Democratic Republic of Congo – shows that some form of conditionalities and demands 
attached to aid money is certainly a good idea. 
 
There were some exceptions to this Cold War logic. Non-aligned and socialist, yet Western, 
Sweden maintained a close and strong development co-operation relationship with Vietnam 
throughout the Cold War and the Vietnam War, especially in fields such as healthcare and 
education. However, the main rule was that nominally communist developing countries 
(which were not necessarily communist in much more than rhetoric) received aid from the 
Soviet bloc and China, and non-communist (not necessarily capitalist or democratic) 
developing countries received aid from the West. The main condition attached was to keep 
rank within your geopolitical bloc (although some countries, like Ethiopia, managed 
successfully to change side).     
 
In the last decade or two, after the Cold War overlay disappeared, and the dysfunctionality 
or outright failure of some African states was revealed, the emphasis on good governance, 
human rights and democratisation has been much stronger among Western donor 
governments. This has taken two forms: First, good governance has been made into a 
conditionality of aid and loans; and second, state institutions other than governments, such 
as parliament and the judiciary, as well as non-governmental organisations – the amorphous 
‘civil society’ – have become an important element of Western aid strategies. I will not 
discuss here the type of economic and fiscal conditionalities that the IMF and World Bank 
introduced in the 1990s in the form of structural adjustment programmes. I will instead 
concentrate on the political sphere and the goals of democratisation and human rights. This 
sphere still only receives something like ten to 15 percent of aid money (and varies from 
donor to donor), but improvements in political governance are increasingly seen as crucial if 
the results of aid are to be sustainable and the benefits lasting.  
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Democracy aid and its impact 
How well has this new emphasis on governance, human rights and democracy worked? I will 
first look at aid projects aimed at improving political governance and strengthening 
democracy, then move on to discuss the benefits and problems accruing from the 
imposition of good political governance standards as an overall conditionality of aid.  
Aiding democratic governance 
In an interview this month, professor Okey Onyejekwe from the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa, based in Addis Ababa, stated clearly why good – and democratic – 
political governance is important on the African continent: 
 
I think the consensus has emerged that when we look at the social, political and economic 
problems in Africa, including the issue of peace and security, the missing link is the 
absence of good governance. Without an environment where you have democratic 
governance, transparent participatory government, respect for human rights, civil liberties, 
you cannot crack economic policies in the absence of these constitutive elements of good 
governance.4 
 
His statement – together with those of many others – indicates that there is now a broad 
consensus among African and Western development experts and politicians that good 
governance is a necessary ingredient for African countries to achieve sustainable 
development and lasting growth. But there is less agreement on how Western donors can 
contribute to creating good governance regimes. Can donor money have an impact on the 
complex political processes of democratisation? Or is democracy aid so difficult that the 
money is better spent on more traditional goals such as education and health care?  
 
It is hard to measure the impact of projects aimed at supporting democratic institutions and 
practices, particularly in the short term. These projects fit badly into the mould that donor 
states have created in recent years, where strong emphasis is placed on aid effectiveness and 
efficiency, and where specific targets and continuous evaluation is incorporated into all new 
                                                 
4 IRIN, Africa: Interview with Governance Expert Prof Okey Onyejekwe (Addis Ababa: IRIN, 16 October 
2003). 
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development programmes. An annual review of whether, say, ‘the judiciary has become 
more independent’ in Mozambique, would probably not yield much result. This is even more 
the case with the chunk of EU donor funds that goes to promoting governance through 
regional institutions on the African continent, such as the African Union or the Southern 
African Development Community. Regionalism is a slow and difficult process wherever you 
are in the world, but has been particularly slow moving in Africa (in practical terms, while 
there is a lot of regionalism on paper). Does this mean that EU aid money to regional 
organisations is a waste because the result over the short-term is negligible?  
 
The fact that the effect of democracy aid is difficult to assess is not an argument against 
providing aid to bolster democracy, but a caution that ways must be found to administer 
these programmes in a sensible way and that the expectations of donors must be placed at an 
appropriate level. Otherwise we risk that the transaction costs in the form of reporting, 
evaluating and attempting to measure impact, for the recipients of these funds become 
excessively high and the money might be better spent in other sectors such as healthcare. 
 
Democratisation and good governance as a condition for aid 
Adhering to certain standards of democratic governance is increasingly becoming a 
condition for developing countries if they want to receive aid from Europe. Denmark, 
particularly after the coming to power of the new government in 2001, is the EU country 
that has gone the furthest in imposing conditionalities and – more importantly – following 
them up by withdrawing aid if the conditions are not met. Thus Denmark withdrew the 
status of core co-operating partner not only from Zimbabwe, but also from Malawi, in 2002, 
and drastically revised its aid programmes across the continent. African countries still 
constitute nine out of the 15 so-called ‘programme countries’ on which DANIDA focuses 
most of its aid activities. But the new policy is that all projects that are given aid money by 
Denmark must have clear and measurable targets, and DANIDA also reserves the right 




   
The distribution of Danish assistance between the individual countries will be evaluated on 
an ongoing and consistent basis against the background of developments in the 
cooperation and the will and capacity of the partners to implement a sustainable, poverty-
oriented development process based on good governance and respect for human rights.5 
 
Zambia, one of the programme countries, has for instance received warning that the political 
situation in that country is being followed closely, after the contested 2001 election, while 
three other African programme countries have had their aid levels reduced due to Danish 
disapproval of certain policies or developments. In the case of Burkina Faso it is violations 
of UN sanctions that are cited; in the case of Egypt, DANIDA feels that not enough has 
been done by that country to reduce poverty; and for Uganda, the problem is that the 
country has not done enough to stop the involvement of its nationals in plundering in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.6 
 
Other countries are following the Danish example. The Norwegian aid agency, NORAD, for 
instance, has just been through an evaluation process, where many of its programmes were 
criticised for a lack of monitoring of their results and impact. In the future, Norwegian aid 
programmes are likely to look more like the Danish ones, with result-oriented projects that 
are constantly controlled, evaluated and documented, and subsumed under a stated goal of 
strengthening civil society and democracy in recipient countries.7 It is unlikely, however, due 
to its more discreet and cautious attitude towards the provision of aid, that Norway will take 
an equally hard-line stance when it comes to pulling out of ‘badly behaved’ countries, 
although NORAD has withdrawn all state-to-state aid to Zimbabwe, traditionally one of 
Norway’s priority development co-operation partners. 
 
                                                 
5 Royal Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Development Policy: Bilateral Assistance’, from the Ministry’s 
Website (www.um.dk/english/dp/ba.asp). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Utenriksdepartementet (Royal Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Årsmelding fra 
Utenriksdepartementets Rådgivende Utvalg for Resultater i Utviklingspolitikken, ‘Chapter Five: Evaluering av 
Utviklingspolitikken’, on the Ministry’s website, www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/p30000969/p30000916/032091-
991639/index-dok000-b-n-a.html.  
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While it is worthwhile to do the utmost to ensure that aid money is well spent – it is after all 
tax payers’ money – there are problems with making political governance a conditionality of 
aid. I will take a look at the more practical problems first, before I move on to the political 
ones. 
 
One problem is excessive rigidity when setting the standards for each development partner. 
Democratisation is a long and difficult process, which sometimes stops and starts and where 
it is possible to enjoy great progress in some areas and setbacks in others. Mozambique, for 
instance, is doing very well in some fields of democratisation, such as the holding of free and 
fair elections and the adherence to term limits for heads of state and government. But the 
country is struggling in fields such as corruption among state officials and organised crime. 
Should Denmark ‘punish’ Mozambique for this failure or encourage it for the things that it 
does right? If Mozambique were to be punished, would this not weaken the democratisation 
process rather than strengthen it? In general, at what point should one start punishing a 
country by taking away aid? If aid is taken away in a time of crisis, could this not contribute 
to the downward spiral? If aid is seen as political leverage, the moment it is taken away 
completely, the leverage is gone.  
 
 A second potential problem, which is politically much more sensitive, is the danger of 
arbitrariness when a donor decides which countries are still ‘worthy’ of aid and which ones 
are not. Too much room is allowed for political considerations – likes and dislikes – to 
determine the fate of a development partner. Why should Malawi be taken off the list of 
Denmark’s ‘programme countries’ while Bangladesh, the world’s most corrupt country, 
according to this year’s Transparency International corruption index, is not punished at all? 
The determination of aid policy out of political consideration has not disappeared with the 
Cold War. This is best seen in some of the United States’ decisions after 11 September 2001. 
The lifting of sanctions and increase of aid to Pakistan had little to do with improvements in 
that country’s governance standards and much more to do with its assistance in the US ‘War 
on Terror’. 
 
In general, good governance conditionality is good and necessary – not least for the 
credibility of the donor country itself. The European Union has strong convictions regarding 
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the type of society it views as morally good and politically and economically sound. The 
credibility of these convictions would be undermined if it donates money to governments 
whose policies fly in the face of EU values. But good governance conditionalities must be 
used with discretion and political understanding. The question the donor should ask itself 
when determining aid levels to a particular country, is not whether points A, B and C on the 
list of conditions are met, according to some quantifiable measure, but whether the country 
is in general moving in the right direction, or, if it is struggling, that it is showing the will to 
keep trying. If a country is clearly and with a great sense of purpose and will, moving in the 
wrong direction, as has been the case for several years in Zimbabwe, then removing aid is the 
right thing to do. Monitoring a country’s adherence to good governance standards should be 
about assessing a process rather than taking a snapshot. The drafters of the NEPAD plan 
were right about arguing this – although the AU has not taken the consequences of this way 
of thinking in practice. If it did, it would have made an effort to politically sanction the few 
African countries that are clearly regressing, such as Zimbabwe and, arguably, Swaziland.   
 
The imposition of good political governance, democracy and human rights standards as 
conditions for aid, has had consequences for the political relations between African and 
European states. Conditionalities, especially when imposed not only on economic policies, 
but also on political institutions and processes, have resulted in that the giving of aid has 
acquired both a more normative and a more coercive nature. Receiving countries are judged 
on whether they deserve aid or not, depending on how free, democratic and well run they 
are. The people who decide whether the country is ‘deserving’ are not nationals, but 
represent a foreign power (sometimes a former colonial power), and sometimes these 
decision makers forget their governance agenda if, as is the case of Pakistan, there are key 
strategic interests involved. Most governments in Africa today have had their leadership 
endorsed through some form of democratic election. Many of them find it problematic that 
they then should have to follow the standards set by outsiders rather than themselves when 
it comes to how they choose to run their country. Even when the standards are very similar 
to the ones that they endorse themselves, it is often seen as a dent in their sovereign pride to 
have to endure others imposing these standards in the form of demands and conditions. 
While it is, in principle, entirely voluntary whether to accept conditional aid or not, in reality 
most poor African countries are highly dependent on aid money and would find it difficult 
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to say no. In 1996, foreign aid constituted the equivalent of 12.3 percent of GDP in Africa, 
if we exclude Nigeria and South Africa.8 This leads us to a discussion of the political 
problem of sovereignty caused by the good governance agenda of donor states. 
 
Aid, democracy and sovereignty: a neo-colonialist agenda or 
help to self-help? 
The stickiest issue when it comes to Western donor’s interests in democracy, good political 
governance and human rights, is that of the international norms of sovereignty and non-
interference. On the African continent, these norms are taken very seriously. African states, 
as they occur on the map today, are almost all relatively young, and many of them acquired 
their independence through armed struggle and bloodshed. The elite solidarity between the 
independence leaders of African states that developed from this struggle is still strong, and a 
combination of a strict notion of sovereignty, non-interference and solidarity lies at the 
foundation of all pan-African or regional treaties and instruments. There is a lot of sensitivity 
– I would argue too much – among African governments over a perceived ‘neo-colonial 
agenda’ lying behind the political demands of donor states. The clash of opinion between the 
EU and AU over how to handle Zimbabwe is the clearest example of this sensitivity, and 
positions on both sides have become so entrenched that it is difficult to see how the two 
regions can build a constructive dialogue on Zimbabwe until the situation within that 
country begins to change. 
 
It is in some ways paradoxical that EU-AU relations should be particularly strained now, and 
that the ‘us and them’ – or even ‘black and white’ – mentality seems to gain ground among 
African political elites. After all, at the level of general principles and outlook, the political 
agenda of the EU and the development aims of African states have never before been so 
well aligned. Western powers have always meddled in the internal affairs of African 
countries. In the 1980s this could even take the form of fuelling wars (as in the United 
States’ support for UNITA in the Angolan civil war) and propping up ailing and repressive 
regimes (as with Mobutu in Zaire). When remembering this history, the type of ‘meddling’ 
                                                 
8 Greg Mills, ‘NEPAD and the AU: Moving from Poverty to Prosperity in Africa’, paper delivered to NEPAD 
seminar at the Portugal Africa Foundation (Porto: 2 October 2003). 
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we are seeing today is in a completely different league. The good governance, democracy and 
human rights standards that African governments are asked to adhere to are universally 
endorsed and set down in the United Nations Charter and the UN Human Rights 
Conventions. They are also the same standards as the ones underpinning the African Union 
– in its Treaty, in NEPAD, and in numerous African declarations and plans of action.9 
African and European states agree, at least in principle, that liberal democracy and sound 
market-orientated economic policies constitute the most viable route towards development 
and poverty alleviation. It is, in other words, difficult to argue that good political governance 
is a Western agenda imposed on the peoples and governments of Africa against their will. 
 
So why the fuss over a ‘neo-colonialist agenda’? Donors, when focusing aid on ‘civil society’, 
tend to forget that for most African states, the problem of development is not that the state 
is too strong, but that it is too weak. It is true that many African governments are too strong, in 
the sense that they dominate the field of politics and that political and economic favours are 
doled out on the basis of political loyalties. However, a bigger problem, compounding that 
of governments being too strong, is the fact that the state institutions over which these 
governments preside are too weak and frail. Most African states have little capacity for policy 
development; often a very weak tax basis and ineffective tax collection system; and 
sometimes the state’s authority stops not many kilometres outside the capital. Local 
governments usually have even less capacity, resources and skills than national authorities 
do.  
 
The weakness of political institutions – the structures of the state – such as the bureaucracy, 
the judiciary, and the legislature – is what allows governments to become too dominant. 
Seen from this perspective, European donors’ emphases on ‘supporting civil society’; laying 
the basis for multi-party politics; bettering the conditions for opposition parties, funding an 
independent media; and generally focusing on strengthening the non-state sectors of society; 
                                                 
9 See e.g. AU, Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa 
(Durban: Heads of State and Government First Standing Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), 8-9 July 2002); AU, Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government (Lomé: AU, 2000); OAU, Ouagadougou Declaration (Ouagadougou: AU Summit, Doc. 
AHG/Decl. I (XXXIV), 8-10 June 1998), to mention some. 
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are easily perceived by African governments as attempting to undermine the authority of the 
state. Even though this is not in fact the aim of donors, this does not take away the reality 
that it is perceived to be the aim. This perception is compounded by the fact that the 
relationship between civil society groups and the state in most African countries is weak and 
often fraught with mutual suspicion or even hostility.    
 
Conclusion 
Because of the political intrusiveness and the infringements on national sovereignty involved 
in focusing development aid on democracy and political governance, there needs to be a 
show of stronger sensitivity on behalf of donors in the way that this aid is dispersed – both 
when it comes to whom it is given to and how it is given. This does not mean that it is off-
limits for donors to take an interest in the political affairs of a recipient country. On the 
contrary, a clearer and more normative vision of, and better control with, how aid money is 
spent is a good thing. It places stronger responsibility on the recipients of aid to spend the 
money well, which is an even better thing. However, the problem of sovereignty means that 
if the donor emphasis on governance is not to produce a backlash in the form of 
deteriorating relations and increasing defensiveness on behalf of African countries, this path 
must be pursued with care. 
 
From the EU’s perspective, one way of easing the political tension and persuading African 
governments of the good intensions of European donors would be to give a clearer sign that 
the EU does indeed view the relationship with Africa as a valuable and equal partnership 
rather than what many African leaders seem to think, as a one-way stream of paternalistic 
charitability, thinly camouflaging self-interested economic policies. This could be done by 
focussing less on aid, and more on other factors that promote development – particularly 
trade, but also migration. While bad governance is a hindrance to economic growth, it is also 
the case that economic sluggishness is a hindrance to democracy and good governance. 
There is general agreement that aid is not the best way to create economic growth. The EU 




   
Migration, because of issues such as remittances and the brain drain, should be an integral 
part of a holistic development policy towards Africa.10 In 2001, remittances to developing 
countries from migrant workers amounted to a staggering US$ 72.3 billion (or 1.3 percent of 
GDP). This is more than what developing countries receive in overseas aid, and the figure 
has been higher throughout most of the 1990s.11 However, the African continent has not 
benefited as much from migrant workers as Asia and South America have. Of the top twenty 
recipient countries of remittances, ranked according to remittances as a percentage of GDP, 
only four are African.12 While the reasons for this are hard to explain, it would seem that the 
EU, the developed region with the closest historical and economic ties with Africa, could 
help do something about this through, for instance, working out a labour migration scheme 
with African governments.  
 
Trade is even more central to growth. The Economist wrote in September this year that: 
 
A new analysis by the World Bank, published in its Global Economic Prospects on 
September 3rd, suggests that an ambitious, though achievable, reduction of trade barriers 
in the Doha round could boost global income by between $290 billion and $520 billion a 
year. Well over half of these gains would go to poor countries. By 2015, the World Bank 
reckons, a successful Doha round could lift 144m people out of poverty. 13  
 
Some of these trade barriers are between developing countries, and it is up to these countries 
themselves, through regional agreements, to get rid of them. But if the EU were to get rid of 
agricultural subsidies, which do not only hurt African producers, but are also costly to 
European consumers, this would have a greater impact on African development than aid 
                                                 
10 This is argued by the Centre for Global Development, which has developed a Commitment to Development 
Index that measures how well the aid, trade, migration, investment, peacekeeping and environmental policies of 
rich states are adjusted to contribute to development in poor countries. See CGD, ‘Ranking the Rich’, in 
Foreign Policy Magazine, May/June 2003, at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/printer.php?storyID=13656. 
11 World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance (Washington: 
World Bank, 2003), chapter 7, ‘Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External 
Development Finance’, p. 158. 
12 Ibid, p.159.  
13 The Economist, ‘The Cancun Challenge’ (London, 4 September 2003). 
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does. It would also give a great boost to African-EU relations. It would show that the EU is 
serious about growth and poverty alleviation in Africa. It would indeed show that the EU is 
serious about all aspects of NEPAD. At the moment we have a situation where African and 
European countries have a very different sense of priorities concerning NEPAD, as well as a 
different understanding of the African-EU dialogue that started with the Cairo Summit in 
2000. While both NEPAD and the declaration from the Cairo Summit stress the importance 
of trade and investment14, the EU has chosen to focus more on the political governance 
elements of these documents. In other words, the EU is focusing on issues within the 
African-EU partnership that are the responsibility of African states to do something about, 
while doing less about issues such as agricultural subsidies that it is their own responsibility 
to do something about. Clearly it is much harder for European countries to agree on the 
issue of agricultural subsidies than the benefits of good political governance, but the focus 
on the internal affairs of African states rather than on the obligations that the EU has 
entered into, nevertheless creates bad feelings among African states and fuels their 
suspicions of hidden agendas – even when there are none. It also goes to show that African 
states are not the only ones who can be accused of signing up to commitments that they do 
not fulfil. 
 
   
 
14 OAU and EU Heads of State and Government, Cairo Declaration: Africa-Europe Summit Under the Ægis 
of the OAU and the EU (Cairo: 3-4 April 2000).  
